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This week's first-round presidential election in Guatemala, and preparations for the January
elections in El Salvador, highlight the remarkable political and electoral transformations that have
accompanied the end of civil wars in both countries. Equally important are the less internationally
visible changes in the permanent apparatus of the state, particularly shifts in the role of the armed
forces, justice systems, and police. Police institutions in particular affect the daily lives of citizens.
As criminologist David Bayley puts it, "The police are to government as the edge is to the knife."(1)
Until the negotiated civil-war settlements, militaries in both countries controlled domestic police
forces, using them as tools of political repression as well as platforms for organized criminal activity.
The militarized police institutions were brutal, corrupt, and ineffective in fighting crime.
The National Police in El Salvador ran the largest death squad in the nation in the early 1980s, while
the Treasury Police and National Guard also carried out thousands of disappearances and overt
acts of repression. The Guatemalan police and Treasury Guard were not as central to the repressive
apparatus, but played a significant role nonetheless and were institutionally weakened by their
subordination to the military.
As part of their peace processes, both El Salvador and Guatemala replaced these military-controlled
security forces with new National Civilian Police (Policia Nacional Civil, PNC) forces. In this context
of demilitarization, political opening, and state reform, individual citizens have sometimes faced
greater insecurity than during the wars.
In El Salvador, the annual rate of violent death for civilians in the first few years of peace was higher
than it had been during the war (2). Guatemala, too, faced postwar increases in some kinds of crime,
most notably armed robbery, kidnapping, rape, and property crimes. Opinion surveys in both
countries reflect public alarm about violent crime and considerable support for iron-fisted responses
by the state. These contradictory trends political liberalization accompanied by increased individual
insecurity raise a significant question for Central Americans as well as for international agencies
that hope to promote democracy in the region: Can effective public security be provided by public
institutions that respect human rights, or is some more authoritarian solution required?
As Brown University political scientist Charles Call has pointed out, "International analysts
generally regard the country's police reforms as the most successful postconflict internal-security
reform of the decade....Yet polls and conversations with everyday citizens show that Salvadorans
have mixed feelings about the police and view justice reforms as a failure."(4) El Salvador In El
Salvador, the new civilian police force was a key element of the peace accords, and an important
guarantee of the future safety of the former rebels of the Farabundo Marti para la Liberacion
Nacional (FMLN). Constitutional reforms stipulated in the accords limited the military's role to
defense against international enemies.
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A new police force was created that included only around 1,000 former National Police and several
hundred former FMLN rebels. The balance of the force, which now numbers in excess of 20,000,
was drawn from the civilian population, excluding former military personnel. Civilians, former
National Police, and former rebels work side by side in the PNC up through the highest command
ranks. PNC agents now outnumber soldiers, and the PNC has far more impact on the daily lives of
Salvadorans than does the military. The PNC's members draw higher pay, are required to have at
least a 12th grade education, and have better equipment and training than was ever the case for the
pre-1993 security forces. This was an unusually profound police reform, involving a nearly clean
slate of personnel, extensive retraining for those few members of former police and rebel forces
incorporated into the police, and, perhaps most importantly, a mostly new officer corps up through
the top command levels.
A mixture of international agencies provided training, institutional development assistance, and
technical advice during the design and rollout of the PNC. Key actors included the UN observer
missions in El Salvador (ONUSAL and MINUSAL), the UN Development Program (UNDP), and the
US Justice Department's International Criminal Investigations Training and Assistance Program
(ICITAP). International donors used their leverage effectively on a number of occasions to ensure
that the PNC project followed the detailed guidelines provided in the peace accords. The Salvadoran
PNC has largely succeeded in its role as guarantor of political space.
There have been no systematic violent attacks against FMLN members or other political groups
since 1993. The political diversity at all ranks helps to ensure some measure of police transparency.
The PNC's enabling legislation and doctrine call for it to use minimal force and to uphold individual
liberties. Although there have been cases of excessive use of force, the PNC's human rights record
overall is far better than that of predecessor organizations.
Observers note serious flaws in the PNC's internal disciplinary mechanisms, but some high- profile
cases of police abuses or criminality have resulted in arrests, prosecutions, and convictions of
police, including high-ranking officers. While it is not satisfactory that the internal disciplinary
system seems to work mainly when the press gets involved, the existence of any accountability
represents significant progress compared with the almost complete impunity of the previous
military-controlled public-security system. The new PNC has been less successful in making
Salvadorans feel safe.
Crime rates have soared in most categories. Homicides peaked in 1996, four years after the peace
accords were signed, and declined thereafter. Crime waves are common after civil wars, but El
Salvador seems an extreme case. El Salvador also represents an unusually sweeping police reform,
compared with the more limited reforms associated with most recent civil-war settlements. Was the
crime wave an inevitable cost of a start-from- scratch police reform? Some increase was probably
unavoidable.
The new force was inexperienced and faced a particularly challenging postwar environment
that included criminal organizations of former combatants and death-squad operators, street
gangs made up of young Salvadorans deported from Los Angeles and other large US cities, and
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very pervasive military weaponry. But decisions that were not essential to the police reform
also worsened the situation. For political reasons, negotiators of the peace accords and their UN
mediators thought it important to quickly demobilize the old National Guard and Treasury Police
forces, leaving only the National Police to provide transitional security. Moreover, the full transition
to the PNC was considered complete when only around 5,000 police had been deployed nationwide.
This proved to be grossly inadequate and created a public-security vacuum that was quickly
exploited by organized criminals.
The international community contributed some UN Civilian Police monitors who did some de
facto policing work during the initial deployment of the PNC, but there was no international
transitional police force such as was used in Cambodia or the Balkans. In the first years of the
PNC, the government neglected investigative units as well as internal disciplinary capacity. These
oversights damaged police effectiveness and allowed criminal practices to take root in some units.
Effective criminal background checks of individuals entering the police were added very late,
with predictable results. Overall, poor planning and implementation of the transition were more
responsible for the problems encountered than the sweeping nature of the reforms themselves.
The long-term challenge facing future administrations in El Salvador will be to institutionalize
adequate investigative and internal-affairs capacity, while moving toward a more integrated
approach to controlling violent crime through a mix of social programs, community participation,
judicial and prosecutorial reform, and more effective policing. Current strategies such as "Plan
Mano Dura" (Iron Fist Plan) sacrifice civil liberties to satisfy public demands for greater protection
from gangs (see NotiCen, 2003-08-28, 2003-09-11). It remains to be seen whether hard-line strategies
will be effective.

Guatemala
Guatemalan government leaders had the advantage of watching events unfold in El Salvador while
they slowly negotiated their own peace accords, completed in December 1996. The government of
Alvaro Arzu (1996-1999) negotiated vague accords that would give the UN little leverage to insist on
implementation of difficult reforms. Once implementation began, Arzu sought to avoid a publicsecurity vacuum comparable to that in El Salvador by very quickly recycling most of the existing
police back into the "new" PNC, with minimal additional training and almost no screening.
Speed of deployment and expediency drove the entire process: recruitment of new police was
done through provincial governors, rather than through mass media. Educational standards
and screening were kept to a minimum to ensure adequate class sizes despite the half-hearted
recruitment efforts. The government inexplicably imposed physical-stature requirements for new
recruits, effectively excluding many potential applicants from the indigenous population of the
country.
The government contracted with a single international donor, the Spanish Civil Guard (Guardia
Civil Espanola, GCE), to provide almost all of the technical assistance to the police. The US ICITAP
program and the UN peace mission (MINUGUA) retained assistance roles, but were somewhat
marginalized. The GCE focused on rapid training, at the expense of quality. While international
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observers have noted that the PNC performs better than the old National Police in many regards, it
is nonetheless only marginally better educated and trained than its predecessor.
No mechanism was established for direct access by civilians to the senior ranks of the police. As a
result, the entire senior officer corps is derived entirely from the old police, and this condition will
persist for many years until new personnel drawn from civilian life can work their way up through
the ranks. As in El Salvador, criminal investigations and internal affairs were severely neglected in
the rush to deploy street cops. The predictable result has been extensive criminality within the PNC.
The result of this expedient path to police development has been mixed. Crime increased in
Guatemala as in El Salvador, with increases in property crimes, kidnapping, and rape. The
kidnapping rate immediately began to subside after a spike in 1997. However, homicides show no
clear trend (in marked contrast to El Salvador). While clearly a bad situation, the postwar increases
in Guatemala do not represent as abrupt or extreme a change as occurred in El Salvador.
In repeated surveys conducted by the Guatemalan Asociacion de Investigacion y Estudios Sociales
(ASIES) in 1997, 1999, and 2001, victimization rates were remarkably constant, with only 1% to 2%
variations over two-year periods, with no observable trend. In comparative terms, Guatemala has
the highest rates of armed robbery and property theft in Latin America, with levels higher even than
El Salvador. However, the homicide rate of 20 per 100,000 in 1995 was less than one- third that in El
Salvador (138 per 100,000), and well below the Latin American average of 31 per 100,000. To some
extent, then, it appears that the Arzu government's expedient strategy was partially successful in
moderating the extent of postwar insecurity.
Guatemalan Annual Crime Incidents Reported by PN/PNC 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Homicides (violent deaths) 3260 3619 3988 3310 2655 2905 3210 Physical Assaults 4378 5280 5561
4728 4704 5401 5798 Kidnappings 5 233 148 61 37 28 32 Rapes 4 110 167 220 323 366 416 Property
Crimes 11350 11072 12030 13107 14597 18605 17553 Arrests (all categories) 19479 21679 49837 69713
67713 77679 (Source: Statistical Tables provided by Minugua) The costs of this approach were high,
however. Guatemala is now saddled with a police force that, while larger and better equipped than
its predecessor, is commanded by the same people, run according to effectively the same doctrine,
and staffed by police agents who in many cases are only marginally literate.
Criminal investigations and internal-affairs capacity remains grossly inadequate to the challenges
faced. In contrast to El Salvador, where the PNC, whatever its faults, is unlikely to be an instrument
of systematic repression by government, the PNC in Guatemala could easily function in such a
way in the future. The weaknesses of the new police were greatly compounded under the Alfonso
Portillo government that took office in 2000. The PNC faced extreme instability of leadership, with
four interior ministers and eight PNC chiefs from 2000 through 2003.
Portillo starved the police of budgetary resources. From 2001 to 2002, both the judiciary and the
PNC suffered significant budget cuts, at the same time that the military enjoyed multiple, irregular
supplements to its budget. International donors could do relatively little to promote a more
democratic model of policing. The peace accords provided only very general guidelines, which gave
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MINUGUA a much weaker role in verifying government compliance than was the case for ONUSAL
in El Salvador. The government established its bilateral agreement with the GCE before the accord
on police and military issues was signed, and the GCE drafted enabling legislation for the police that
did not incorporate provisions of the peace accord. Subsequently, the European Union (EU) came
through with a 31.7 million euro grant for the PNC.
The entire project was implemented by the GCE, again without significant conditionality. Both
ICITAP and MINUGUA pushed for improved standards with respect to investigations and internal
controls, but their financial leverage was limited and they failed to coordinate their positions.
International leverage was further undermined by divisions among donors regarding whether the
Public Ministry (MP) responsible for prosecutions or the PNC should control criminal investigations.
Currently both the ministry and the PNC operate detective units and seldom coordinate their
efforts.
Despite the lack of legal basis for the MP's detective corps, some donors have lost confidence
in the police and have supported the MP's role. The result has been no effective international
pressure on the government to implement PNC development in a way likely to produce a force that
is both protective of human rights and effective in controlling crime. As a result of this legacy of
expediency and neglect, future Guatemalan governments will face severe challenges in improving
the effectiveness and human rights performance of the police.
Little can be done in the short run about the very serious problems with respect to quality of
personnel and leadership. Nonetheless, stronger internal controls would go some way toward
limiting human rights violations. Direct access by highly trained civilians to senior ranks would
increase transparency and facilitate development of a new organizational culture. And careful
screening and culling of current personnel could gradually eliminate individuals who are least
appropriate for policing a democratic society.
The peace processes in El Salvador and Guatemala provided opportunities for dramatic publicsecurity reforms. The changes implemented, particularly in El Salvador, address long-standing
deficiencies of the previous police forces. But change has brought high costs and shaken public
confidence. Better management of the transition from old to new might have reduced the postwar
crime wave. In both countries the challenge now is to address institutional weaknesses that resulted
from haste and excessive emphasis on deploying large numbers. This will require governments
with sufficient popular credibility and legitimacy to proceed slowly to screen, select, and train the
people needed to achieve effective investigative and internal-affairs units. It will also depend on the
cooperation of the public in working with police to prevent crime, while resisting the temptation of
simplistic "mano dura" strategies.
Citations: (1) David Bayley, Patterns of Policing: A Comparative International Analysis. New
Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1985, p. 189. (2) Charles Call, "El Salvador: The Mugging of
a Success Story," in Constructing Justice and Security after War, Charles Call, ed., Forthcoming. (3)
William Stanley, "Business as Usual? Justice and Public Security Reform in Post-War Guatemala,"
in Constructing Justice and Security after War, Charles Call, ed., Forthcoming. (4) Charles Call,
"Mugging of a Success Story," op. cit.
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